Constitutionalism Outside the Courts
Ernest A. Young*
In September of 1957, Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas ordered the
National Guard to prevent black students from entering Central High School in
Little Rock. The nine students sought to enter pursuant to a desegregation plan
adopted by the Little Rock School Board to comply with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions in Brown v. Board of Education.1 Brown had held that racially
segregated public schools were unconstitutional, but Faubus disagreed. With
Faubus’s support, the Arkansas legislature had enacted “interposition” legislation,
which directed the state to prevent enforcement of Brown until such time as the
states could ratify a constitutional amendment shifting power over integration
from the courts to Congress. 2 Faubus filed suit in the state courts to block
desegregation in Little Rock, and—citing fears of violence arising from the
controversy over the City’s schools—he ordered the National Guard to prevent
any further steps toward integration and maintain order.3
Governor Faubus’s suit was unsuccessful, and President Eisenhower
ultimately deployed federal troops to ensure the black students’ safety.
Continuing public turmoil outside the school, however, led the school board to
ask the federal district court to postpone implementation of the desegregation
plan. That court agreed, but the case—now known as Cooper v. Aaron4—went up
to the U.S. Supreme Court. A remarkable opinion signed by all nine justices,
declared that “[t]he constitutional rights of [the black students] are not to be
sacrificed or yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed upon the
actions of the Governor and Legislature.”5 The Court pointedly “answer[ed] the
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premise of the actions of the Governor and Legislature that they are not bound by
our holding in the Brown case.”6 Invoking “basic constitutional propositions,” the
Court insisted that “that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the
law of the Constitution. . . . It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the
land” and therefore binding on all state officials, including Governor Faubus.7
No one today doubts that Cooper’s result. Scholars and judges have had
considerably more trouble, however, with the Court’s statement that “the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.” During the
Reagan years, Attorney General Edwin Meese challenged judicial supremacy as a
way of attacking liberal precedents like Roe v. Wade.8 And as the Court turned
(somewhat) to the right under Chief Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts,
liberal academics began to talk about “taking the Constitution away from the
courts.”9 Other scholars have stressed the positive contributions to constitutional
development of legislators, executive branch officials, and popular social
movements.10 And both lawyers and judges have had to grapple with difficult
questions concerning the deference owed to constitutional interpretations by other
government institutions.11
The assault on judicial supremacy has had the salutary effect of
highlighting both the limits of judicial review and the important roles that other
actors play in shaping constitutional meaning. Outside the academy, however,
there is little evidence of public dissatisfaction with judicial review or enthusiasm
for alternative forms of popular constitutionalism. This, I submit, is because the
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important rule of law function fulfilled by the Supreme Court has never amounted
to “judicial supremacy” in the first place.
I.

The Revolt Against Judicial Supremacy

Article VI of the Constitution requires all public officials, state and
national, to swear an oath “to support this Constitution.” 12 All lawyers and
military personnel make a similar promise. 13 The breadth of this commitment
makes any notion that the Constitution somehow “belongs” to the courts hard to
sustain. Each of these posts, after all, may require constitutional judgments—
whether it is a President deciding whether or not to sign a bill, a soldier
determining whether to follow an order, or a policeman considering whether he
may legally search a house.
All naturalized citizens, moreover, must take a similar oath.14 This reflects
the fact that all citizens are frequently invited to consider arguments about the
constitutionality of various laws and proposals or to assess which would-be
officials would be the best guardians of constitutional values.15 And of course
many social movements, from the civil rights movement to the Tea Party, have
framed their arguments in explicitly constitutional terms. Everyone involved in
Cooper—including Governor Faubus, President Eisenhower, the Arkansas
legislature, the Little Rock School Board, and even the private citizens gathered
outside the high school—had not only a right but an obligation to interpret the
Constitution as it bore on the situation before them (although many of them
undoubtedly got the Constitution wrong).
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In this sense, as Sanford Levinson has pointed out, America espouses a
“Protestant” approach to constitutional meaning.16 We have a “priesthood of all
[constitutional] believers,” in which each individual can read and interpret the
constitutional text for himself. And yet, we also undeniably have a “priesthood”
whose interpretations have a privileged role. The literature on judicial review and
popular constitutionalism arises out of this tension.
A.

Marbury and Departmentalism

Cooper’s declaration of judicial supremacy relied directly on Chief Justice
John Marshall’s statement in Marbury v. Madison17 that “[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”18 But the
two cases raised quite different issues. Marbury concerned the Court’s ability to
set aside a federal statute that contravened the Constitution in the course of
resolving a litigated dispute. Governor Faubus’s challenge to the Court’s
authority in Cooper, on the other hand, concerned the binding effect of Supreme
Court precedents on nonjudicial actors not party to a prior decision. The
conceptual daylight between these two questions gives rise to a widely-accepted
form of constitutionalism outside the courts: the departmentalist view that each
institution of government can (and must) interpret the Constitution for itself in the
course of its own institutional responsibilities.19
Marbury was difficult precisely because Congress, as well as the judiciary,
is obliged to interpret the Constitution. Congress, after all, presumably thought
that it was acting consistently with the constitution when it enacted the Judiciary
Act’s provision at issue in Marbury. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion readily
established the Constitution’s supremacy over a conflicting statute, 20 but that
hardly establishes that the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution is supreme
over Congress’s.21 The best reading of Marbury insists simply that the Court has
jurisdiction to consider cases “arising under” the Constitution, and that when it
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does so it need not defer to other branches’ interpretations of that document.22
But that reading simply does not speak to other political actors’ obligations to
defer (or not) to the judiciary’s interpretations.23
Thomas Jefferson articulated the departmentalist alternative to judicial
supremacy by refusing to view “judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional
questions”; rather, he said, “[t]he constitution has erected no such single tribunal .
. . . It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within
themselves.”24 This position better fits Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury. If the
power to interpret the Constitution judicial review stems from the performance of
the Court’s underlying judicial function, then similar authority would seem to
stem from Congress’s and the President’s performance of their functions.
The trouble with departmentalism is that constitutional functions often
overlap. Congress passes a law, exercising its judgment that the law is
constitutional, but then someone challenges that law in a court. Our tradition,
consolidated when President Nixon turned over the tapes,25 is that the authority of
non-judicial officials to interpret the Constitution for themselves does not extend
to defying court orders. That is enough to decide Cooper, given that Governor

22

See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 72-73 (6th ed. 2009).
23

See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 19, at 406-07 (observing that it is “a long step
from judicial review—the authority of a court, when deciding cases, to refuse to
give force to an act of a coordinate branch of government—to judicial supremacy,
the obligation of coordinate officials not only to obey that ruling but to follow its
reasoning in future deliberations”).
24

Thomas Jefferson, Letter to William Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820, in 12 PAUL L.
FORD, ED., THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161-64 (1905). Three other
positions have been proposed: legislative supremacy, executive supremacy, and
“confederational departmentalism.” See Murphy, supra note 19, at 410-11, 420
n.28. Marbury rejected legislative supremacy, and the only serious attempt to
revive it—by the Radical Republicans of Reconstruction—did not last. As
Professor Murphy points out, “constitutionalism is wary of arguments that allow
popularly elected officials final authority to define substantive rights. . . . One
does not, as the Italian proverb goes, make the goat one’s gardener.” Id. at 411.
Few argue for executive supremacy in constitutional interpretation.
On
“confederational departmentalism,” see infra text accompanying notes 38-Error!
Bookmark not defined..
25

See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
5

Young, Constitutionalism Outside the Courts

1/16/2015 draft

Faubus’s actions interfered with the federal district court’s decree in the Little
Rock desegregation litigation.26
This “modified version” of departmentalism 27 acknowledges that courts
will often have the last (and binding) word, but it tempers that concession to
judicial supremacy in two ways. First, there are many questions that the courts
cannot decide. These include disputes over constitutional meaning that never take
the form of an Article III “case or controversy,” as well as those that are
nonjusticiable “political questions.” Although the contemporary Court has tended
to define “political questions” quite narrowly,28 its restrictive doctrine of standing
leaves many constitutional disputes outside the federal courts’ jurisdiction. 29
Second, the doctrinal tests by which courts decide constitutional questions
frequently incorporate substantial deference to political actors.30 John Marshall’s
test for federal legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause, for example,
largely accepted legislative judgments of “necessity” as binding on the courts.31
A thornier difficulty stems from the distinction between the judgment and
precedential force of judicial decisions. Political actors may not defy judicial
pronouncements of constitutional meaning when they are parties to a judgment in
a litigated case, but what about when they are not? Can they simply ignore the
Supreme Court’s interpretation and continue to act according to their own
reading? If there had been no judicial decree in Cooper, then Governor Faubus’s
action in excluding the black students from Central High School would have
defied the precedential force of Brown but contravened no judgment. Some
opponents of judicial supremacy have suggested that a decision’s res judicata
force is all that binds, and that political actors have no obligation to follow a
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judicial precedent with which they disagree so long as they were not parties to the
litigation.32
This suggestion founders on the fact that courts hold government officials
liable all the time for violating constitutional interpretations pronounced in
litigation to which they were not parties. As Dan Farber has pointed out, “[i]t is
simply wrong to say that constitutional rules can be violated with impunity until
after entry of an enforcement decree.”33 Both state and federal officials may be
sued for damages when they violate the Constitution, and they will be liable if
they violated “clearly established law”—even if the relevant constitutional
meaning is “established” only by judicial opinions.34 This retrospective liability
rests on a constitutional wrong occurring at a time when the official was not
subject to any judicial decree. Such liability makes sense only if governmental
officials are bound not only by judicial judgments, but also by judicial
precedents.35
The remedial law reflects a pragmatic balance between respect for
political actors’ authority to interpret the Constitution and the rule-of-law interests
in preventing infringements of individuals’ rights. When courts issue prospective
decrees against governmental officials, they apply their own unmediated view of
constitutional meaning; when courts impose retrospective liability for violation of
a prior precedent, however, non-judicial actors have a “good faith” or
“reasonableness” defense.
This provides some interpretive leeway for
government officials operating in areas in which the Constitution’s meaning
remains ambiguous or disputed. At the same time, government officials may not
act with impunity against persons who have not already secured an injunction
against unconstitutional action.36 Such remedies are a significant departure from
departmentalism; after all, the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct is measured
against judicial precedents. That this departure is so well established 37
32

See, e.g., Meese, supra note 8; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 263-64
(1962) (arguing that Southern officials were bound to accept Brown only when
they became parties to specific judicial decrees).
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demonstrates the extent to which our constitutional regime sees some degree of
judicial supremacy as necessary to the rule of law.
A final point about departmentalism: There is no logical reason to restrict
the power to interpret the Constitution to branches of the federal government.
Professor Murphy equated “confederational departmentalism”—which entails
only that state governmental officials, like federal ones, must interpret the
Constitution in the course of their own duties—with “nullification,” which “held
the states to be the final interpreters.” 38 That hardly follows. After all,
Congress’s departmental right to interpret the Constitution when it legislates is
not the same thing as legislative supremacy. State officials’ constitutional
interpretations are subject to the same constraints that federal non-judicial
interpretations are—that is, they remain subject to the possibility of federal
judicial review, including retrospective damages liability when state officials
violate clearly established law. Governor Faubus was not wrong to disagree with
the Supreme Court in Cooper simply because he was a state official. The
problem was that he interfered with a federal court order in a pending case—and
that he got the meaning of the Constitution wrong.
B.

Judicial Efficacy and the “Hollow Hope”

A quite different challenge to judicial supremacy concerns the practical
limits of judicial efficacy rather than the theoretical limits of judicial authority.
Alexander Hamilton famously said that “the judiciary . . . will always be the least
dangerous [branch] to the political rights of the Constitution,” because it “has no
influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or
of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever.”39 “It
may truly be said to have neither force nor will,” Hamilton insisted, “but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for
the efficacy of its judgments.” 40 Working in this Hamiltonian tradition,
contemporary analysts have persuasively questioned the courts’ ability to effect
significant social change without assistance from other institutional actors.
The most prominent critic in this vein, Gerald Rosenberg, emphasizes the
limits of the Court’s accomplishment in Brown. 41 That case held segregated
schooling unconstitutional; its remedial sequel ordered segregated school districts
38

Murphy, supra note 19, at 420 n.28 (emphasis added); see also id. (arguing that
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to integrate. Follow-on decisions not only rejected state officials’ right to
challenge Brown but held efforts to circumvent it unconstitutional. 42 In all these
cases, Professor Rosenberg points out, “the Court had spoken clearly and
forcefully.”43 Moreover, during the ten-year period after Brown, Congress and
the Executive remained largely silent on desegregation; hence, “[t]he decade from
1954 to 1964 provides close to an ideal setting for measuring the contribution of
the courts vis-à-vis Congress and the executive branch in desegregating public
schools.” 44 The results are striking—and quite sobering to notions of judicial
supremacy. In the Southern states, “[f]or ten years, 1954-64, virtually nothing
happened. Ten years after Brown only 1.2 percent of black schoolchildren in the
South attended school with whites.”45 The situation radically changed, however,
once Congress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which authorized the Attorney
General to bring federal desegregation suits on behalf of individuals, and the 1965
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which provided a huge pot of federal
aid money to public school districts but made that money contingent on steps
toward desegregation. By the 1972-73 school year, over 91 percent of black
schoolchildren attended school with whites.46 Rosenberg concluded that “Brown
and its progeny stand for the proposition that courts are impotent to produce
significant social reform.”47
One might offer a number of rejoinders to Professor Rosenberg’s account,
the most persuasive being that judicial actions—particularly the Brown
decision—play a catalytic role by inspiring social movements and spurring other
governmental actors to action. Historian David Garrow has written, for example,
of “the direct influence of Brown on the instigation of the 1955 Montgomery
[bus] boycott. Almost every significant black Montgomery activist of that time
has without prompting spoken of Brown's importance for the bus protesters.”48
42

See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Goss v. Board of Education of
Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Griffin v. Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218
(1964).
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Id. at 49.
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of desegregation over time.
47
48

Id. at 71.
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Moreover, judicial decisions may play a more central role in particular settings—
for example, in defending reformers from attacks and, more generally, in
protecting the sorts of political freedoms that make reform possible.49 But in each
of these scenarios, judges play a supporting role to non-judicial actors,
particularly broad social movements, that pursue their constitutional vision
primarily outside the courts. Vigorous debate persists concerning the extent to
which judicial decisions matter out in the world, but no one believes anymore that
constitutionalism inside the courts can go it alone.
C.

Popular Constitutionalism

The most prominent contemporary theories of constitutionalism outside
the courts now parade under the banner of “popular constitutionalism.” Popular
constitutionalists are highly critical of judicial review, although they differ in their
prescriptions. Mark Tushnet proposes “taking the Constitution away from the
courts” entirely, while Larry Kramer proposes “judicial review without judicial
supremacy.” 50 Both urge that people outside the professional community of
lawyers, judges, and bureaucrats should play a greater role in constitutional
interpretation. But popular constitutionalism’s proponents remain resolutely
ambiguous about the affirmative meaning of their theory—that is, the manner in
which “the People themselves,” in Larry Kramer’s phrase, can implement their
own views of constitutional meaning.
Professor Tushnet’s thesis is the easier to parse. He proposes that the
Supreme Court simply swear off judicial review, 51 leaving political actors to
interpret the Constitution for themselves in the course of political debate. He also
introduces a distinction between a “thin Constitution”—the good parts,
comprising mostly the Preamble and the Declaration of Independence—and a
“thick constitution” consisting of “detailed provisions describing how the
government is to be organized.”52 “Populist constitutional law vindicates the thin
constitution,” Tushnet says; is is “a law oriented to realizing the principles of the
7, 82 n. 353 (1994) (concluding that “the Brown decision was a relatively
unimportant motivating factor for the civil rights movement”).
49

See, e.g., New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 378 U.S. 254 (1964) (relying on
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to prevent use of libel litigation
to deter coverage of the civil rights movement by news organizations); Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (overturning convictions of civil rights protesters
involved in lunch counter sit-ins on due process grounds).
50
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Declaration of Independence and the Constitution’s Preamble.” 53 In the absence
of judicial review, this thin constitution—the “fundamental guarantees of
equality, freedom of expression, and liberty”—would guide political actors in
fulfilling the social project begun by the Declaration.54
Professor Tushnet’s distinction between the “thick” and “thin”
constitutions seems to play a pivotal role in populist constitutionalism.
Presumably populist mobilization, necessary to make the views of the broader
people count in constitutional debate, is unlikely with respect to the institutional
detail that comprises the thick constitution; these details, in his view, do not “thrill
the heart.”55 It is true that Madison did not stress judicial review as a mechanism
for enforcing the Constitution’s institutional structure,56 and later theorists have
urged that principles of federalism and separation of powers can be left to
“political safeguards.”57 As I discuss in Part II, this sort of political enforcement
itself represents an important form of constitutionalism outside the courts.
And yet much of the key business of judicial review involves the policing
of institutional boundary disputes. 58 Erin Delaney and Barry Friedman have
argued that the Supreme Court’s pivotal role in constitutional interpretation
developed out of the need to referee federalism disputes between the national
government and the states.59 And the Court hears a significant number of cases
each term involving the preemption of state law by federal statutes under the

53

Id. at 12, 181.

54

Id. at 11, 31.

55

Id. at 10.
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See The Federalist No. 51, supra note 39, at 347-53 (James Madison) (stressing
non-judicial checks and balances).
57

See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE
OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980).
58

See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (rejecting arguments
that a dispute over whether the President or Congress had power to dictate the
contents of a passport issued to a child born in Jerusalem was a nonjusticiable
political question).
59

See Barry Friedman & Erin Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal
Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137 (2011).
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Supremacy Clause60—a provision that Professor Tushnet would relegate to the
“thick” constitution but that formed a central part of the Founders’ design. The
point is twofold: First, it is not at all clear that one could eliminate judicial review
of these institutional boundary issues without profoundly altering the operation of
the governmental system in ways that popular constitutionalists have not fully
investigated. Second, the Founders viewed the structural provisions of the thick
constitution—the proposal of 1789, which lacked a Bill of Rights, much less a
Fourteenth Amendment—as the key to vindicating the principles of the thin
constitution. 61 The Preamble, after all, is only a preamble. To say that the
Constitution’s institutional arrangements should be vindicated neither by judicial
review nor by populist constitutionalism is to tear the heart out of their
constitutional project.
It is not surprising, then, that Professor Tushnet quickly points out that a
world without constitutional judicial review might nonetheless preserve means for
courts to police boundaries and check arbitrary governmental behavior.62 But it is
unclear why statutory or common law review would not raise the same problems
that lead populist scholars to criticize judicial review in the first place. Is the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard in administrative law really less open-ended
and judge-empowering than the various doctrines of constitutional law? The most
controversial case of the present Supreme Court term is Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 63 which concerns whether religiously-oriented corporations that
object to certain forms of contraception are entitled to an exemption from the
contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act. The difficulties of judicial
review in that case are hardly lessened by the fact that the plaintiffs’ primary
claims are under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act—a statute64—rather than
the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution. In any event, relying on nonconstitutional forms of review to check political actors is neither “populist” nor
“outside the courts.”

60

See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption
Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253.
61

See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover
Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1277, 128485 (2004).
62

See TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 163-65 (pointing out that “[a] great deal of what
we in the United States know as constitutional law parades in Great Britain as
administrative law”).
63

No. 13-354 (October Term 1013).
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Dean Kramer’s popular constitutionalism would not abolish judicial
review outright; instead, he proposes “judicial review without judicial
supremacy.”65 As I have already discussed, one may wonder how much judicial
supremacy there really is in contemporary America; so many situations arise in
which judicial review is unlikely or judicial remedies are limited that our system
resembles Professor Murphy’s “modified” departmentalism. Kramer’s
prescription appears to add two related elements. First, he evidently believes that
the substantive standard of judicial review should be more deferential in particular
areas—especially the aspects of federalism doctrine that limit national power.66
Second, he would subject the Supreme Court to the ultimate check of popular
will. He urges his countrymen to “insist[] that the Supreme Court is our servant
and not our master: a servant whose seriousness and knowledge deserves much
deference, but who is ultimately supposed to yield to our judgments about what
the Constitution means and not the reverse.” At the end of the day, Kramer insists,
“[t]he Supreme Court is not the highest authority in the land on constitutional law.
We are.”67
It is hard to quarrel with Dean Kramer’s plea for the public to take a
greater interest in constitutional law, but beyond that it is hard to know what to
make of his proposal. He points out that “[t]he Constitution leaves room for
countless political responses to an overly assertive Court: Justices can be
impeached, the President can ignore its mandates, Congress can strip it of
jurisdiction or shrink its size or pack it with new members or give it burdensome
new responsibilities or revise its procedures.”68 These prescriptions are a recipe
for exponential escalation of the partisan rancor that has divided Washington,
D.C. in the past several years. But Kramer also cites incidents of “extralegal
violence” and “mobbing” as “traditional forms of popular constitutionalism.”69
Scot Powe points out in a devastating review that the most prominent
example of Kramerian popular constitutionalism in recent memory is the South’s
“Massive Resistance” to the Court’s decision in Brown. 70 Resistance took
multiple forms, from the “Southern Manifesto,” signed by eighty percent of
Southern senators and representatives, criticizing the Court’s constitutional
65

KRAMER, supra note 9, at 249.

66

See Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court,
115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 138-53 (2001).
67

KRAMER, supra note 9, at 248.

68

KRAMER, supra note 9, at 249.

69

Id. at 110.

70

L. A. Powe, Jr., Are “the People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone
Care)? 83 TEXAS L. REV. 855, 866-70 (2005) (book review).
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interpretation in Brown, to the state laws purporting to block Brown’s
implementation through “interposition” or circumvent its mandate through
various dodges, to the mob outside Central High School in Little Rock seeking to
intimidate black students and prevent them from entering. Dean Kramer does not
discuss massive resistance, and he offers no criteria that might distinguish it from
legitimate instances of popular constitutionalism. 71 Just as it has become
impossible to advocate a theory of constitutional interpretation that cannot support
Brown, 72 it is hard to take seriously a theory of interpretive authority that
condones the South’s massive resistance to that decision.
It is worth noting that despite the moniker, “popular constitutionalism” is a
highly elite and almost entirely academic movement. “[S]upporters of judicial
supremacy are today’s aristocrats,” accuses Larry Kramer—the former dean of
the Stanford Law School and now President of the multi-billion dollar Hewlett
Foundation.73 Of course, most populist movements have elite leadership. But
there is little evidence that the distrust of judicial review felt by these scholars is
widely shared. A leading survey taken in 2001—the year after Bush v. Gore—
found “a remarkably high level of loyalty toward the Supreme Court on the part
of most Americans.”74 In particular, 69.2 percent of respondents agreed with the
71

See id. at 870. In an essay generally defending Kramer, Mark Tushnet seems to
concede that massive resistance counts as popular constitutionalism; he suggests
only that other popular mobilizations, such as the civil rights movement itself,
may have done enough good to outweigh the harm of massive resistance. See
Mark V. Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 991, 994 n.10, 1004 n.49 (2006). Of course, one can acknowledge the role
of social movements in persuading lawyers and judges to change their view of the
Constitution and in prompting the political branches to add their enforcement
powers to judicial remedies without condoning outright defiance of judicial orders
or “extralegal violence.”
72

See TUSHNET, supra note 9, at 156.

73

Similarly, Mark Tushnet is the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at
the Harvard Law School. My own view is that this couldn’t have happened to a
nicer (or more deserving) guy, but then I am not a populist.
74

James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring
Attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 358
(2003). Professor Gibson performed a later survey in 2005 that confirmed his
earlier findings. See James L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the United States
Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507, 532
(2007) (finding that “the U.S. Supreme Court is widely supported by the
American people, and that support has little to do with ideology or partisanship”);
see also Manoj Mate & Matthew Wright, The 2000 Presidential Election
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proposition that “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court should have the right to say what the
Constitution means, even when the majority of the people disagree with the
Court’s decision.”75 Moreover, “a great deal of loyalty to the institution can be
found even among those who have hardly any confidence in the Court. For
instance, the vast majority of those who have little confidence in the Court are
nonetheless unwilling to support doing away with the institution.” 76 These
findings strongly suggest that, even if public confidence in the Court’s present
performance fluctuates, 77 the Court’s diffuse support is sufficiently strong to
make calls for popular constitutionalism distinctly unpopular.
Proponents of popular constitutionalism generally acknowledge the broad
public support for judicial review; as Dean Kramer puts it, “everyone nowadays
seems willing to accept the Court’s word as final.” 78 Kramer offers several
reasons: “heightened skepticism about popular democracy occasioned by
twentieth-century totalitarianism; the historical anomaly of the liberal Warren
Court; two generations of near consensus about judicial supremacy among
intellectuals and opinion-makers on both the left and the right (not to mention
among high school civics teachers).” 79 One may or may not agree with these
reasons, but it is implausible to describe 69.2 percent of the population as
“today’s aristocrats.” And even if we can attribute such deep-seated public
approval of the Court to false consciousness, it means as a practical matter that
radical visions of popular constitutionalism are unlikely to get off the ground.
There is another possibility, however. The public may approve of judicial
review because it senses that, over time, the Court is in fact reasonably responsive
Controversy, in NATHANIEL PERSILY, JACK CITRIN, & PATRICK J. EGAN, EDS.,
PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 333 (2008) (concluding
that strong public support for the Court had recovered from any loss of legitimacy
occasioned by the Court’s ruling in Bush v. Gore).
75

Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, supra note 74 at 358 (Table 2).

76

Id. at 361 (emphasis in original).

77

The latest Rasmussen poll has 28 percent of respondents saying that the
Supreme Court is doing a “good” or “excellent” job, while 26 percent rated the
Court’s performance as “poor.” Rasmussen Reports, Supreme Court Update,
March
26,
2014,
available
at
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/mood_of_america/supr
eme_court_update. By comparison, Congress’s numbers were 7 percent “good”
or “excellent” and 64 percent “poor.” Id.
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KRAMER, supra note 9, at 228; see also id. at 232, 333 nn. 5-8 (citing the same
surveys cited in note 74, supra).
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Id. at 232.
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to views about the Constitution held by “the People themselves.” That is the
thesis of Barry Friedman’s recent history of the relationship between the Supreme
Court and public opinion. 80 Professor Friedman concludes that “[o]ver time,
through a dialogue with the justices, the Constitution comes to reflect the
considered judgment of the American people regarding their most fundamental
values. It frequently is the case that when judges rely on the Constitution to
invalidate the actions of the other branches of government, they are enforcing the
will of the American people.” 81 On this view, constitutionalism inside and
outside the courts are not wholly different categories; rather, each influences the
other over time.
As Friedman points out, moreover, this dialogue is a way of managing
“the intractable tension between majority rule and constitutionalism that is innate
to the American system of government.” 82 It may well be that the American
people do not simply want their own way at all times; rather, they also want to be
bound by law to respect constitutional processes and minority rights. 83 Notably,
today’s constitutionally-oriented social movements of both left and right—such as
the gay rights movement, proponents of gun rights, and the Tea Party—have not
attacked and often invited judicial review as part (but only part) of their strategies
for social change. At the end of the day, the various academic revolts against
judicial review have done a valuable service by supplementing our understanding
of the processes shaping constitutional meaning, but they have hardly displaced
the courts’ central role.
II.

Constitutionalism in Politics

We are unlikely to do away with judicial review, or to adopt drastic
measures—e.g., impeachments, jurisdiction-stripping—punishing wayward courts
when they disagree with public opinion on particular questions. Judicial review is
simply too much a part of the American fabric, and the academic outrage against
our moderately conservative Supreme Court that prompts much popular
constitutionalist writing does not seem to be shared by the general public. But the
80

BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF
INFLUENCE THE SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTION (2009).
81

Id. at 367-68.

82

Id. at 367.

THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
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See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in
THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25, 27-28 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva Siegel, eds.
2009); see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-8, at
18-24 (3rd ed. 2000) (discussing the constitutionalist desire to tie oneself to the
mast).
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intellectual ferment of popular constitutionalism has shed considerable light on
the many ways in which constitutionalism outside the courts already plays a
critical role in our polity. I discuss four here: the protection of particular
constitutional values through political processes and institutional checks; the role
of social movements in shaping constitutional meaning; resolution of particular
constitutional controversies in the political branches through processes of
“constitutional construction”; and the role of “administrative constitutionalism.”
These phenomena have a common theme.
They each address
constitutional questions—that is, issues like the balance of power between state
and national governments or discrimination against women and racial minorities.
But these forms of constitutionalism tend to answer those questions through
extra-constitutional means, by enacting and interpreting statutes or establishing
conventions of governmental practice. They thus highlight the extent to which
constitutionalism flourishes in our polity not simply outside the courts, but
outside the Constitution itself.
A.

Political Safeguards

American debates about the meaning of the Constitution’s federal
structure reproduce in microcosm the larger debates about the legitimacy of
judicial review itself.84 Writing in 1954, Herbert Wechsler challenged the need
for judicial review of federalism issues, suggesting that “the Court is on weakest
ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in
the interest of the states, whose representatives control the legislative process and,
by hypothesis, have broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged Act of
Congress.”85 A quarter-century later, Jesse Choper urged the Court to abandon
judicial review of both federalism and separation of powers issues entirely in
order to preserve its political capital for individual rights cases. 86 Both scholars
relied on the expectation that structural values can be adequately preserved
through a form of constitutionalism outside the courts—that is, the political and
institutional checks and balances that operate through the ordinary political
process.

84

Indeed, the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions seem to be what set Dean
Kramer off. See, e.g., Kramer, Foreword, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 138-53.
85

Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 543, 559 (1954).
86

JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 2-3 (1980).
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Legal scholars have slaughtered forests debating whether political and
institutional safeguards are sufficient to protect constitutional federalism
principles (curiously, Dean Choper’s suggestion has never been taken all that
seriously with respect to separation of powers).87 The Court has never accepted
the view that they are.88 But it remains clear that these extra-judicial safeguards
are the primary mechanisms for protecting structural values.89 As Brad Clark has
explained, “federal lawmaking procedures . . . preserve federalism both by
making federal law more difficult to adopt, and by assigning lawmaking power
solely to actors subject to the political safeguards of federalism”—that is, to
Congress, which in turn is made up of representatives beholden to the States.90
Moreover, a wide variety of wholly extra-constitutional structures, from the
87

See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219 (2000) (criticizing
Wechsler’s version of the political safeguards argument, and substituting an
argument based on political parties); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1459 (2001) (criticizing political safeguards arguments generally); Lynn A. Baker
& Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51
DUKE L. J. 75 (2001) (arguing that there is no reason to suspend judicial review
for federalism but not other constitutional issues). One suspects that the lack of an
equivalent debate about separation of powers may be attributed to shared
concerns on both Left and Right about institutional overreaching among the
branches of the federal government. The contrasting enthusiasm for the “political
safeguards of federalism,” on the other hand, exists because for many years most
liberal legal scholars viewed federalism as a discredited principle unworthy of
respect. See, e.g., Seth Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 67 (2001)
88

The closest the Court has come is Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985),
which rejected an extra-textual limit on federal regulation of state governmental
institutions themselves. But in other cases, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts
have heeded Professor Wechsler’s own concession that the Court may not
“decline to measure national enactments by the Constitution when it is called
upon to face the question in the course of ordinary litigation.” Wechsler, supra
note 85, at 559. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
89

See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV.
1349, 1353-55 (2001).
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Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2001).
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structure of the political parties to state lobbying organizations like the National
Governors Association to the role of state bureaucrats implementing federal
regulatory schemes, have grown up to permit states to influence the operation of
federal policy.91
In a sense, political safeguards for structural principles are not
“constitutionalism” at all. Members of Congress who oppose federal legislation
typically do so because they think it is bad policy, or because it threatens the
interests of their constituents—not because they think it contravenes
constitutional principles of federalism. And state bureaucrats who push
implementation of federal programs typically do so for policy reasons, not
constitutional ones. Nonetheless, the structure of the lawmaking process protects
state autonomy by making it relatively easy for opponents of federal legislation to
block federal legislation; likewise, the structure of federal regulatory programs
provides numerous opportunities for influence, foot-dragging, and outright
subversion by state officials charged with implementing federal laws. 92 These
dynamics, in turn, protect the constitutional value of state autonomy. This is
constitutionalism not simply outside the courts but on auto-pilot, dating back at
least to Madison’s reliance on “opposite and rival interests . . . in all the
subordinate distributions of power” to hold the constitutional structure in place.93
B.

Social Movements

Much constitutional scholarship in recent years has focused on the role of
social movements—such as the African American civil rights movement, the
women’s rights movement, or the movement for gun rights—in shaping
constitutional meaning. As Reva Siegel has explained, “[s]ocial movements
change the ways Americans understand the Constitution. Social movement
conflict, enabled and constrained by constitutional culture, can create new forms
of constitutional understanding—a dynamic that guides officials interpreting the
open-textured language of the Constitution’s rights guarantees.” 94 Social
movements may reinforce and extend the constitutional vision articulated by the
91

See generally JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES
PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (2009).
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See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative
Federalism, 118 YALE L. J. 1256 (2009).
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The Federalist No. 51, supra note 39, at 349 (James Madison).
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Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323,
1323 (2006); see also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. CIVIL-RIGHTS CIVIL-LIB. L. REV. 373
(2007).
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Court, as the civil rights movement did in the years after Brown, or they may run
counter to established constitutional interpretations, as the gun rights movement
did in the years prior to District of Columbia v. Heller.95 In either case, they
represent a classic form of constitutionalism outside the courts.
While the importance of social movements is obvious, the precise ways in
which they shape constitutional meaning—in particular, the ways in which a
movement’s vision gets translated into constitutional law—is less clear. Jack
Balkin has identified two distinct institutional paths by which social movements
may influence the development of constitutional law. The first runs through
political parties and judicial appointments: “social movements . . . influence the
two major political parties, which, in turn, control the system of judicial
appointments.”96 Hence, social activism “leads to the appointment of judges who
sincerely believe that the best interpretation of the Constitution is one that
happens to be sympathetic with social movement claims.” Professor Balkin and
Sanford Levinson have called this mechanism “partisan entrenchment,” reflecting
the likelihood that judges appointed by political partisans may outlast the political
force of the social movement that brought them to the bench.97
The second path involves the influence of social movements on “the
values of national elites.”98 According to Professor Balkin, “[s]ocial movement
politics play a crucial role in getting both popular and elite opinion to view the
world differently and to acknowledge changes as salient and important.”99 This
path differs from the first in that “[a]ppeals to national elite values try to change
constitutional doctrine by changing the minds of sitting judges,” which tend to
reflect elite opinion, “while the strategy of partisan entrenchment tries to change
the judges.” 100 Other institutional mechanisms may also be important. As I
discuss further in Section D, social movements may also succeed in enacting
legislation, such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which in turn shape the
development of constitutional law.
95

554 U.S. 570 (2008); see generally Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism
as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008).
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Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the
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(2005).
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The contrast between this conception of popular constitutionalism and
Dean Kramer’s is instructive. Kramer advocated extraordinary measures to
disobey, overturn, or intimidate the courts; the popular constitutionalism of
Professors Siegel, Balkin, and others, by contrast, operates by persuading the
institutions of government (including courts) to act through established channels
(including judicial review). As such, the latter view is likely to be far more
congenial to an American public that retains considerable respect for both the
courts and the role of judicial review.
Broad-based forms of popular constitutionalism may be particularly
influential with respect to principles of constitutional law that are
“underenforced” in current doctrine.101 Larry Sager has demonstrated that much
constitutional doctrine stops short of implementing the full normative content of
particular constitutional provisions, instead deferring to political actors on
institutional grounds.102 Examples in current law would include the constitutional
limits on delegation of legislative authority to administrative agencies,
discrimination against non-suspect classes, and legislation impairing the
obligation of contracts. In each of these areas, courts have not felt confident in
substituting their own judgment for those of the governmental actors subject to
judicial review. 103 The extent to which any given constitutional principle is
underenforced, however, is historically contingent; many principles have been
both rigorously enforced and underenforced at different periods of our history.104
When the underlying constitutional culture that had supported judicial deference
changes, the Court’s doctrine may change too.105
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See Ernest A. Young, Popular Constitutionalism and the Underenforcement
Problem: The Case of the National Healthcare Law, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
157, 193-98 (2012).
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See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that rational basis review under the Commerce Clause
“reflects our respect for the institutional competence of the Congress on a subject
expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation of the legitimacy
that comes from Congress’s political accountability in dealing with matters open
to a wide range of political choices”).
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See Young, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 101, at 182-85.

105

See id. at 181-82.
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Constitutional doctrine frequently trades on notions of what is
“normal.”106 In the middle of the last century, Americans tended to look to the
national government for solutions to social problems—an expectation reflected in
high trust levels for national institutions compared to state and local ones.107 But
conceptions of normalcy can change, often in response to the efforts of social
movements. The Court’s more vigorous enforcement of federalism limits on
national power has occurred contemporaneously with a significant shift in public
trust away from national institutions toward state and local ones and a more
general skepticism of national regulation reflected in the Tea Party movement.108
Likewise, the gay rights movement has changed conceptions of what counts as a
“marriage” or a “family” in ways that are beginning to be reflected in
constitutional doctrine. 109 Participants in these movements need not think of
themselves as interpreting the Constitution in order to shape the way that
constitutional principles are implemented.
C.

Constitutional Construction

Non-judicial actors do not simply interpret the Constitution; sometimes
they have to fill in the gaps. Keith Whittington’s concept of constitutional
“construction” addresses this function, which rests on the fact that “[t]he various
branches of government not only share overlapping powers . . . they also possess
distinctive perspectives, resources, and capacities that help to shape political
outcomes.”110 To be sure, some of the work that political branch officials do is
interpretive in the same sense as judicial interpretation. But often political actors
do something quite different. As Professor Whittington explains, “constructions
do not pursue a preexisting if deeply hidden meaning in the founding document;
rather they elucidate the text in the interstices of discoverable, interpretive
106

See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate
Challenge Went Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC, June 4, 2012, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-thewall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/.
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See Megan Mullin, Federalism, in PERSILY, CITRIN, & EGAN, supra note 74, at
209, 216-19.
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See Young, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 101, at 193-98; see also
FRIEDMAN, supra note 80, at 194 (concluding that the Rehnquist Court’s
“federalist revival” was broadly consistent with American public opinion);
Mullin, supra note 107, at 214 (analyzing the shift in public trust in favor of the
states).
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meaning, where the text is so broad or so underdetermined as to be incapable of
faithful but exhaustive reduction to legal rules.”111
Just as social movements may have the most influence in elevating
constitutional principles that were previously underenforced, so too constitutional
construction has the most room to operate in areas where the constitutional text is
indeterminate. Over the course of our history, the political branches have had to
confront numerous questions that are constitutional in character, but on which the
Constitution and its associated interpretive materials provide no answer.
Examples include the proper standard for impeaching federal judges or the scope
of the President’s power to remove executive officials once appointed and
confirmed by the Senate.112 While interpretation involves a search for preexisting
meaning by an ideally objective interpreter, construction is a process by which
political actors with partisan stakes create meaning within the space afforded by
constitutional indeterminacy. Judges tend to play a minimal or nonexistent role in
this process.
The notion of constitutional construction by political actors raises as many
questions as it answers. One concerns the precedential force of political practice
when the legality of the construction is challenged in court. 113 One response
would be to say that because legitimate construction occurs in the interstices that
the constitutional text leaves open, one prerequisite of a construction’s validity is
that the space is, in fact, open. If the underlying constitutional principles are not,
in fact, indeterminate, then their interpretive meaning must control. One might
draw an analogy to the Chevron doctrine in administrative law, which requires
courts to defer to constructions of federal statutes by administrative agencies—but
only if the underlying statutory provision is ambiguous. 114 On the other hand, a
settled construction by political actors is likely to influence the way that a court
111

Id. at 5. Judges, too, sometimes engage in construction as opposed to
interpretation. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction
Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENTARY 95, 103-04 (2010); Keith E. Whittington,
Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENTARY 119, 128
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reads the underlying constitutional principles. And that construction may, in
some circumstances, have staying power even in the event of judicial invalidation.
The Court’s decision on the legislative veto provides an example. A
perennial problem in separation of powers law concerns the extent to which
Congress may delegate lawmaking power to the executive and the means by
which it may control the exercise of that power. The Constitution says little
directly about this question, and what it does say—that all of the national
legislative power is vested in Congress 115—seems impracticable under modern
circumstances. Beginning in the 1930s, Congress qualified some of its
delegations to the Executive with legislative veto provisions, which allowed it to
override particular executive actions pursuant to delegated authority without
going through the difficult procedure specified in Article I for enacting a new
statute. 116 By the 1980s, nearly 200 legislative veto provisions were scattered
throughout the U.S. Code; it seems fair to say that although the President
continued to raise constitutional objections from time to time, Congress had
succeeded in securing practical acquiescence to its construction. This did not stop
the Court from holding the legislative veto unconstitutional, however, in INS v.
Chadha,117 on the ground that it permitted Congress to act with legal force in a
way that departed from the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure” specified in Article I. Nonetheless, Congress has continued to enact
legislative veto provisions in the years after Chadha, and the executive branch
largely complies with them as a matter of practical necessity. 118 Although the
Chadha decision means that these vetoes are no longer legally enforceable by
judicial order, the political branches’ construction retains life outside the courts.
D.

Administrative Constitutionalism

A final approach to constitutionalism outside the courts rejects the
“romantic understanding of the judge-enforced Constitution” in favor of “a more
realistic view” centered on the enactment and implementation of federal
statutes. 119 William Eskridge and John Ferejohn begin their account of
democratic constitutionalism with the observation that “the written Constitution
left many things essentially unresolved, including the extent of the franchise for
federal and state elections, the precise authority of the president, the extent and
115
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reach of the federal judiciary, and the role of judges in enforcing rights.” 120
Moreover, “the Constitution’s high hurdle for formal amendment limited the
extent to which the continuing struggle over the content of our democratic
constitutionalism . . . could be resolved as a matter of Large ‘C’ Constitutional
law. “121 Conventional constitutional theory holds that these gaps have been filled
in largely through the process of judicial review, with common law elaboration
providing the necessary play in the joints that allows an old and hard-to-amend
constitution to remain relevant to contemporary society. Professors Eskridge and
Ferejohn, by contrast, contend that the primary instruments of constitutional
change have been statutes, executive orders and agency rules, and treaties and
other agreements.
Like many of the other accounts of popular constitutionalism already
considered, the “administrative constitutionalism’ of Professors Eskridge and
Ferejohn is avowedly ideological in motivation. The conventional judge-centered
account, they argue, has a libertarian bias—judges are good at elaborating
individual rights and structural principles that check the power of government, but
bad at “address[ing] the duties of government to create and guarantee affirmative
and positive legal regimes that provide security and structure for American public
finance, families, employment and commercial activities, old-age and disability
insurance, and national defense.” 122 These duties—reminiscient of Professor
Tushnet’s “thin constitution” consisting of the Declaration of Independence and
the Preamble123—are best vindicated through our “Republic of Statutes.”124
Administrative constitutionalism is a form of popular constitutionalism in
the sense that “the ultimate form of political agency is found in We the People,
acting through regular elections and the associated devices of political parties but
also by means of political associations and interest groups and through popular
social movements.” 125 Nonetheless, “the primary governmental actors are
legislators, executive officials, and administrators” who promulgate, interpret, and
implement statutes and other subconstitutional legal directives.126 Hence the term
“administrative constitutionalism.”
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The great virtue of this approach is that it allows conceptual space for the
two distinct faces of constitutionalism, even if Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn
do not give those faces equal prominence. One face, emphasized by popular
constitutionalists, views the Constitution as “the vehicle by which a democratic
polity develops its own fundamental values.”127 This strand tends to emphasize
government empowerment, and it looks naturally—as Eskridge, Ferejohn, and
Tushnet all do—to the statements of governmental purpose in the Preamble. The
other face of constitutionalism emphasizes constraint; the Constitution, on this
view “incorporates a series of rules that impose second-order constraints on the
first-order policy preferences of the people and their elected representatives and
executive officials.”128 Stressing constraint tends to shift our focus not only to
negative liberties against government but also to the structural hurdles that the
Constitution raises against government action.129
Like most analytical typologies, this one fails to capture the full
complexity of the subject. The equality principle in the Fourteenth Amendment is
both a constraint on discriminatory government activity and a value to be realized
through positive government action. And such Preamble-driven action may be
necessary to render negative constraints on government effective; public
education of the citizenry, for instance, plays a critical role in developing not only
a vibrant marketplace of ideas under the First Amendment but also an informed
electorate capable of checking politicians at the ballot box. Nonetheless, the
difference between the two faces of constitutionalism helps to explain why
proponents and critics of popular constitutionalism so often talk past one another.
Popular constitutionalism makes sense for the first face; it is hard to argue that
unelected judges should have exclusive or even primary authority to define
national values and pursue the affirmative ends of government. But external
constraint on the pursuit of those ends is an important (if not the only) aspect of
the second face. Our tradition has generally relied on judges to provide that
external constraint on political action.130
Administrative constitutionalism focuses on the government-empowering
first face of constitutionalism, but it generally does not take strong anti-judicial
review positions that undermine the Constitution’s external constraint function.
This leaves room for disaggregating those functions as a matter of constitutional
theory. In other work, I have distinguished three primary functions of
constitutions: constituting the government (creating governmental institutions
127
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and delimiting their jurisdiction, procedures, and powers); creating rights; and
entrenching certain principles against constitutional change.131 A key insight of
administrative constitutionalism is that all of these functions are performed not
only by the canonical text of 1789 and its subsequent formal amendments, but
also by statutes, regulations, and settled government practices. 132 As Karl
Llewellyn put it back in 1934, “most of the going framework of our Leviathan is
hardly adumbrated in the Document. As a criterion of what our working
Constitution is, the language fails in both directions. It affords neither a positive
nor a negative test.”133
Popular constitutionalism encourages political actors to flesh out the
constitutive framework of our government and to expand the catalog of rights that
people have. It may even entrench these reforms, as a practical matter, by
establishing programs with enduring bases of popular support.134 Political actors
can generally undertake these actions without running afoul of the judgedominated constraining face of constitutionalism because the Constitution is
either silent or permissive on most of the relevant questions. As Fred Schauer
puts it, “[t]he Constitution . . . says remarkably little about what the government
should do, and that is as it should be.”135 The limits are not nonexistent, and
sometimes efforts to extend the reach of governmental programs, alter
governmental frameworks, or create new entitlement will run into serious
constitutional constraints.136 But in general the Constitution allows considerable
room for development and elaboration without implicating the constraining
function of the courts.
This is an important advantage, because theories of popular
constitutionalism that must disparage the constraining function of judicial review
risk losing track of something important. The notion that certain principles
remain off limits from infraction, no matter how good the intentions of
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government actors or how sound their policy arguments, still stands at the heart of
American constitutionalism. A good theory of popular constitutionalism needs
an account of constitutional change outside the formal amendment process, a
theory by which constitutional principles and values can guide the positive actions
of government, and room for the continuing importance of judicial review’s
constraining function.
It is also worth noting that administrative constitutionalism is not entirely
a theory of constitutionalism outside the courts. After all, the statutes,
administrative regulations, treaties, and the like that flesh out our constitutional
structure and values are themselves generally subject to judicially interpretation
and enforcement. For example, as Cass Sunstein has observed, “Broad
delegations of power to regulatory agencies, questionable in light of the grant of
legislative power to Congress in Article I of the Constitution, have been allowed
largely on the assumption that courts would be available to ensure agency fidelity
to whatever statutory directives have been issued.” 137
Administrative
constitutionalism thus not only leaves room for traditional judicial review in
constitutional cases, but it also does not get off the ground without expanding the
reach of judicial review to cover the Constitution outside the Constitution.
Conclusion
Theories of constitutionalism outside the courts have both a positive and a
negative project. On the positive side, they remind us that the Constitution
belongs to all of us—not just judges, but also legislators, bureaucrats, executive
officials, and private citizens. All of these actors have both the opportunity and
the responsibility to interpret and implement constitutional principles, and all of
these actors have a role in the development of those principles over time. This
has always been true, and the Founders knew it well. But constitutional scholars,
lawyers and judges are always at risk of forgetting, and the reminder that scholars
of popular constitutionalism have provided is a valuable contribution indeed.
The negative project is to attack judicial review. Some of this critique
reflects longstanding concerns about the anti-democratic nature of the institution
and the indeterminacy of constitutional principle, which leaves room for the entry
of the judges’ own political preferences. But the popular constitutionalism
literature also reflects something of a shift in the orientation of liberal
constitutional theory.
Perhaps because the judiciary has become more
conservative than in the heyday of the Warren Court, and perhaps because liberals
have recently enjoyed somewhat more sway in the political branches than they
once did, many progressives have come to prefer the constitution outside the
courts. Although political liberals once championed the Court’s role in enforcing
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the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, for example, it has now become
fashionable for them to reject that role.138 We have, in some ways, returned to
the political alignments of the Progressive Era and the New Deal, when
conservatives took refuge in the courts and liberals championed action by the
political branches and the regulatory bureaucracy. It is sufficient commentary on
this development to observe that what can change once can change again.
As Governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus was correct in undertaking to
interpret the Constitution for himself and in acting on that interpretation in the
performance of his official functions. It is important to get the Constitution right,
however, and history rightly condemns Faubus because he interpreted the
Constitution poorly, and in a way that harmed citizens who deserved better.
Faubus was wrong, moreover, to interfere with the courts’ ultimate settlement
function in litigated constitutional controversies. If the Constitution is to continue
to act as an external constraint on political action, then constitutionalism outside
the courts can never be wholly autonomous of constitutionalism inside.
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